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#### Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

**Buell, 3** (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

#### That causes mass wars

Brzoska 8 (Michael Brzoska, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

#### Their apocalyptic warming focus trades off with environmentalism – turns its own end

**Crist, 7** (Eileen Crist, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse”, http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964 work, an entire socio-cultural-economic life—from (actual or aspired to) ways of eating and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinking—“binds the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the origins of the collective’s participation in its own domination to the “historical” moment that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 21–22. After the decisive turn when the social body became implicated in its own domination, “what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective” (ibid.). And elsewhere: “The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities” (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential distinction between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, characterized by the focus on symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist overtones—implying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply, while others flounder with superficialities—the shallow-deep distinction has been significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how “symptomology” leads merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as “the problem”—as opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist enterprise as the problem—we arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements,” in George Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151–55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### The system is collapsing around us – climate change, resource scarcity, militarization of society, etc. are all a result of state-centric security discourse and the failure of IR to recognize the complexity of the global system – it’s try or die to shift the frame or ensure human extinction

**Ahmed 12** (Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, PhD in international relations from the School of Global Studies at Sussex University, executive director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, former professor of international relations at Sussex, writer for the Guardian, 2012, “The International Relations of Crisis and the Crisis of International Relations: From the Securitisation of Scarcity to the Militarisation of Society,” *Global Change, Peace & Security* Volume 23 Issue 3)

Unfortunately, orthodox IR approaches are ill-equipped to understand the complexity of these¶ interconnected global crises and their interdependent impacts on the international system.¶ Generally, IR scholars have examined global crises as discrete phenomena. Economic and¶ financial crises are studied within the discipline of International Political Economy, particularly¶ with a view to understanding their structural causes and trajectories, sometimes including their¶ impact on development, inequality and poverty. Energy depletion as a global systemic¶ problem is rarely acknowledged in the IR literature, but when (rarely) acknowledged, it is¶ largely viewed through the lens of energy policy as an arm of ‘national security’. Similarly,¶ climate change is examined in the context of its strategic implications in exacerbating vulnerability¶ to violent conflict or scrutinised in the context of the scope for inter-state negotiations¶ and global governance.54¶ For the most part, IR as a discipline has not fully acknowledged the real-world scale of these¶ crises as inherently interdependent phenomena requiring an integrated and holistic theoretical¶ appraisal. Many traditional neorealist scholars, of course, view environmental factors as of either¶ minimal or negligible significance in identifying future security threats and explaining past,¶ present or potential inter-state conflicts.55 Yet as evidence of climate change has become more¶ disturbing, such perspectives have been increasingly contested. While some scholars tend to¶ focus on the role of natural resource shortages or abundance in engendering conditions of¶ anarchy and violence, others investigate the capacity or inability of states to negotiate viable¶ cooperative international regulatory frameworks to prevent or respond to crises. As such, most¶ theorists draw either implicitly or explicitly on neorealist or neoliberal assumptions about state¶ behaviour in the international system, debilitating their ability to understand these crises precisely¶ in their global systemic context.¶ 2.2 Neorealism: tragedy as self-fulfilling prophecy¶ In one salient example, O’Keefe draws extensively on both offensive and defensive variants of¶ neorealist theory, including the work of Jack Snyder, Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz, to¶ argue for realism’s continuing relevance in understanding how the ‘biophysical environment¶ plays a significant role in triggering and prolonging the structural conditions that result in conflict’.¶ She notes that standard realist concepts such as ‘anarchy, security dilemmas, and the prisoner’s¶ dilemma’ can be used to explain the emergence of environmental or resource-based violent¶ conflicts largely within, and occasionally between, the weaker states of the South. ‘Environmental¶ anarchy’ occurs in weak states which lack ‘active government regulation’ of the internal distribution¶ of natural resources, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’. This generates resource scarcities¶ which lead to ‘security dilemmas’ over ownership of resources, often settled by resort to¶ violence, perpetuated by ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’.56¶ Ultimately, this theoretical hypothesis on the causes of environmental or resource-related conflict¶ is incapable of engaging with the deeper intersecting global structural conditions generating¶ resource scarcities, independently of insufficient government management of the internal distribution¶ of resources in weak states. It simplistically applies the Hobbesian assumption that¶ without a centralised ‘Leviathan’ state structure, the persistence of anarchy in itself generates conflict¶ over resources. Under the guise of restoring the significance of the biophysical environment¶ to orthodox IR, this approach in effect actually occludes the environment as a meaningful causal¶ factor, reducing it to a mere epiphenomenon of the dynamics of anarchy in the context of state¶ failure. As a consequence, this approach is theoretically impotent in grasping the systemic acceleration¶ of global ecological, energy and economic crises as a direct consequence of the way in¶ which the inter-state system itself exploits the biophysical environment.¶ The same criticism in fact applies to opposing theories that resource abundance is a major¶ cause of violent conflict. Bannon and Collier, for instance, argue that resource abundance and¶ greed, rather than resource scarcity and political grievances, generated intra-state conflicts¶ financed by the export of commodities in regions like Angola and Sierra Leone (diamonds) or¶ West Africa (tropical timber). In other regions, abundance rather than shortages of oil, drugs¶ and gold fuelled and financed violent secessionist movements in the context of widespread corruption¶ and poor governance.57 Ultimately, this departs little from the theoretical assumptions¶ above, with weak central state governance still blamed for generating anarchic conditions¶ conducive to conflict over abundant resources. Furthermore, as Kaldor shows, this simplistic perspective¶ overlooks the wider context of the global political economy – the evolution of regional¶ ‘war economies’ was often enabled precisely by the devastating impact of neoliberal structural¶ adjustment programmes, which eroded state structures and generated social crises that radicalised¶ identity politics.58¶ Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must¶ involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised governance¶ structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well¶ as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism understands¶ inter-state competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty¶ about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains¶ for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to¶ all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is¶ the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as¶ over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ultimately¶ amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual¶ benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states.¶ The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and¶ escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system¶ that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploitative¶ relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as¶ ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas.59¶ Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself¶ powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect,¶ despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues¶ like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame¶ these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne¶ Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy¶ a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it¶ entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically,¶ this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate international¶ security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing¶ resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 Neorealism thus negates its¶ own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state¶ foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the¶ global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of¶ warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation?61¶ 2.3 Neoliberalism: mutual over-exploitation as normative¶ On the other hand, we have strategies of international cooperation to establish new global governance¶ regimes by which states can develop treaties and agreements to encourage mitigating action.¶ It is now clear that the massive proliferation of international legal treaties designed to regulate¶ activities impacting detrimentally on the environment and thus limit environmental degradation¶ simply cannot be explained under the realist theoretical framework. While this seemingly vindicates¶ neoliberal theoretical approaches which underscore the scope for rational state strategies of¶ mutual cooperation,62 the latter are still at a loss to explain the extent to which ethical norms and¶ values, national cultures and environmental and scientific advocacy underpin wide-ranging¶ environmental regimes which cannot be reduced purely to state interests.63¶ Much of the liberal literature also explores the regressive dynamic of the energy industry and¶ its international dimensions, though failing to escape realist assumptions about anarchy. Kaldor¶ and her co-authors, for instance, note that conflicts can erupt in regions containing abundant¶ resources when neopatrimonial states collapse due to competition between different ethnic and¶ tribal factions motivated by the desire to control revenues.64 Similarly, Collier argues that the¶ most impoverished populations inhabit the most resource-wealthy countries which, however,¶ lack robust governance, encouraging rampant internal resource predation and therefore civil¶ wars.65 Lack of robust governance thus facilitates not only internal anarchy over resource¶ control, but also the illicit and corrupt activities of foreign companies, particularly in the¶ energy sector, in exploiting these countries.66 This sort of analysis then leads to a staple set of¶ normative prescriptions concerned largely with ways of inculcating ‘good governance’, such as¶ transparency measures to avoid excessive secrecy under which oil companies indulge in corruption;¶ more robust international regulation; corporate social responsibility; and cosmopolitan principles¶ such as democratisation, political equality and freedom of civil society.67¶ Yet such well-meaning recommendations often do not lead to sufficiently strong policy action¶ by governments to rein in energy sector corruption.68 Furthermore, it is painfully clear from the¶ examples of Kyoto, Copenhagen and Cancun that international cooperative state strategies continue¶ to be ineffective, with states unable to agree on the scale of the crises concerned, let alone on¶ the policies required to address them. Indeed, while some modest successes were apparent in the¶ Cancun Accord, its proposed voluntary emissions regime would still likely guarantee – according¶ to even mid-range climate models – a global average temperature rise of 4°C or more, which¶ would in turn culminate in many of the IPCC’s more catastrophic scenarios.69¶ This calls into question the efficacy of longstanding recommendations – such as Klare’s – that¶ the international community develop unprecedented international mechanisms to coordinate the¶ peaceful distribution of natural resources in the era of scarcity and environmental degradation.70¶ While at face value such regulatory governance mechanisms would appear essential to avoid¶ violent conflict over depleting resources, they are posited in a socio-political and theoretical¶ vacuum. Why is it that such potentially effective international mechanisms continue to be¶ ignored? What are the socio-political obstacles to their implementation? Ultimately, the¶ problem is that they overlook the structural and systemic causes of resource depletion and¶ environmental degradation.¶ Although neoliberalism shares neorealism’s assumptions about the centrality of the state as a¶ unitary rational actor in the international system, it differs fundamentally in the notion that gains¶ for one state do not automatically imply losses for another; therefore states are able to form cooperative,¶ interdependent relationships conducive to mutual power gains, which do not necessarily¶ generate tensions or conflict.71 While neoliberalism therefore encourages international negotiations¶ and global governance mechanisms for the resolution of global crises, it implicitly¶ accepts the contemporary social, political and economic organisation of the international¶ system as an unquestionable ‘given’, itself not subject to debate or reform.72¶ The focus is on developing the most optimal ways of maximising exploitation of the biophysical¶ environment. The role of global political economic structures (such as centralised private¶ resource-ownership and deregulated markets) in both generating global systemic crises and inhibiting¶ effective means for their amelioration is neglected. As such, neoliberalism is axiomatically¶ unable to view the biophysical environment in anything other than a rationalist, instrumentalist¶ fashion, legitimising the over-exploitation of natural resources without limits, and inadvertently¶ subordinating the ‘global commons’ to the competitive pressures of private sector profit-maximisation¶ and market-driven solutions, rather than institutional reform.73 Mutual maximisation of¶ power gains translates into the legitimisation of the unlimited exploitation of the biophysical¶ environment without recognition of the human costs of doing so, which are technocratically¶ projected merely as fixable aberrations from an optimal system of cooperative progress.74¶ Consequently, neoliberalism is powerless to interrogate how global political economic structures¶ consistently undermine the establishment of effective environmental regimes.¶ 2.4 The socio-historical evacuation of the political ecology of power¶ Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of¶ modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientific reason in the service of unlimited¶ economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of modernity’s¶ very existence. This stark contradiction between official government recognition of the potentially¶ devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of¶ government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that¶ has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis. It reveals an analytical framework¶ that has focused almost exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete¶ picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of projected¶ impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure¶ of the international system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting¶ effective national and international responses.¶ It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself¶ symptomatic of IR’s insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the normative¶ emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature’s overwhelming¶ preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic¶ crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory¶ or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security¶ challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to¶ maximise national political–military and international regimes’ powers so that states might be¶ able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure¶ do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends¶ up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity.¶ The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction¶ of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by¶ which to define and delineate the dynamics of material power. While orthodox realism focuses¶ inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts¶ to extend this conceptualisation to include economic dimensions (including the role of transnational¶ corporations) – as well as production, finance, ideas and institutions beyond the state –¶ do not solve the problem.75 This Weberian proliferation of categorisations of the multiple dimensions¶ of power, while useful, lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of rendering¶ their interconnections intelligible.¶ As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from¶ Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe¶ from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined¶ with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social–¶ property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’¶ power.76 In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’¶ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres¶ with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77¶ It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material¶ conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as¶ mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested¶ through social–property relations.78 By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus¶ human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual categories¶ necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are¶ mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world.79 While further fragmenting¶ the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be analysed¶ through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating¶ these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capitalist¶ classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour.80¶ Indeed, the mediating structure of the global political economy – along with the beliefs and behaviour¶ of agents within it (through which this structure is constructed) – play a critical role in the transformation¶ of ecological or resource-related events into concrete politically-defined conditions of¶ ‘scarcity’ that lead to crisis or conflict. A powerful example is provided by Davis in his study of the¶ impact of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) – the vast oscillation in air mass and Pacific¶ Ocean temperature. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ENSO created large-scale droughts¶ in many countries peripheral to the European empires, including those in Asia (India, China, Java,¶ the Philippines and Korea), and in Brazil, southern Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Davis shows that¶ British ‘free market’ imperial policy converted these droughts into foreseeable but preventable¶ deadly famines, multiplying death tolls to gross proportions without any historical precedent.81¶ In 1874–76, northern harvests were more than sufficient to provide reserves for the 1878¶ autumn crops deficit. But most of the grain from north-western Indian subsistence farming was¶ controlled by a captive export sector designed to stabilise British grain prices, which from¶ 1876 to 1877 had increased due to poor harvests. This generated a British demand that absorbed¶ almost the entirety of north-western India’s wheat surplus. Meanwhile, profits from these grain¶ exports were monopolised by wealthy property holders, moneylenders and grain merchants, as¶ opposed to poor Indian farmers. India’s newly-constructed modern railway system shipped¶ grain from drought areas ‘to central depots for hoarding’, leading to exorbitant price hikes that¶ were ‘co-ordinated in a thousand towns at once’. Food prices rocketed out of the reach of ‘outcaste¶ labourers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants’. Consequently, ‘the poor¶ began to starve to death even in well-watered districts “reputed to be immune to food shortages”’.¶ Thus, between 1877 and 1878, grain merchants exported a record 6.4 million hundredweight of¶ wheat to Europe while between 5.5 and 12 million Indians starved to death. This catastrophe¶ occurred ‘not outside the modern world system, but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated¶ into its economic and political structures’.82¶ As Dalby thus argues, ‘humans live in a complex interaction with environments that adapt and¶ change in much more complex ways than is facilitated by linear thinking within the territorial¶ boxes of contemporary administrative arrangements’. This suggests ‘that “global” markets and¶ economic connections are essential to understanding the complex politics of “local” environments¶ and struggles over access to specific resources in particular places’ – because the ‘geography of¶ the domination of nature’ is precisely the continuing ‘history of colonisation and imperialism’.83¶ Hence, environmental and energy crises are generated in the context of historically-specific sociopolitical¶ systems – and whether or not they lead to conflict depends on existing relations of power¶ at local, national and transnational scales, and on how those relations are configured by structures¶ of resource ownership, mediated by ideas and values, and supported by military power.¶ 3. From securitisation to militarisation¶ 3.1 Complicity¶ This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the¶ manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to ecological,¶ energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific¶ socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted,¶ and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and¶ historical materialism).¶ Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate¶ behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp¶ that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context¶ of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is¶ embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system¶ itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration¶ of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the¶ economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84¶ Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically¶ erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of¶ seeking security.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present¶ order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-¶ destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason –¶ thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently¶ erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence.¶ Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions¶ organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent¶ to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic¶ crises.87 ¶ By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social,¶ political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation¶ of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power¶ rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects¶ for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under¶ the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic¶ structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect¶ the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the¶ failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency¶ to ‘securitise’ them – and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation¶ responsible for magnified global insecurity. ¶ ‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities¶ identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme¶ nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It¶ thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’,¶ therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and¶ into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a¶ mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the¶ state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military–¶ police measures in purported response to an existential danger.89¶ The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels¶ of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises¶ generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains¶ to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance¶ of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated¶ from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded¶ and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is¶ that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce¶ them to their symptoms.¶ Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new¶ theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such¶ as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international¶ criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass¶ destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’¶ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy¶ of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily¶ examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of¶ global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current¶ organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent¶ transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their¶ military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93¶ Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in¶ ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given¶ that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the¶ state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In¶ the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity¶ to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them¶ as a control mechanism.¶ 3.2 From theory to policy¶ Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a¶ redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of¶ traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments¶ and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of¶ international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The¶ US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’¶ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier¶ which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’.95¶ In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis¶ acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their¶ purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic¶ populations. Paradoxically, this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer.¶ Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees¶ greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international¶ conflict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations¶ and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which¶ ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return¶ to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting¶ natural resources and overseas markets’. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors¶ by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96¶ A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global¶ energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing¶ energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are¶ ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately¶ 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing¶ to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions¶ such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of¶ the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is¶ that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of¶ violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations.¶ A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable¶ ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting¶ developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent¶ and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’¶ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept¶ of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international¶ system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an¶ intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class,¶ the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources¶ and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99¶ 3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation?¶ Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular¶ religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends¶ this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic¶ structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation¶ paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social¶ groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In¶ other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues¶ orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global¶ crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state¶ system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous¶ ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of¶ new ‘outsider’ identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process¶ of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the¶ ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive¶ complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on¶ ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary¶ discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic¶ interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and¶ the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich¶ region critical for global capitalism.100¶ But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses¶ is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary¶ discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies¶ throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes.¶ It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is¶ not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence¶ in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to¶ destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different.101 As Hinton¶ observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of ‘othering’ in which an imagined community¶ becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and¶ dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or¶ economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102¶ In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological¶ process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in¶ accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and¶ classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’,¶ justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would¶ be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally¶ connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate¶ the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that¶ of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating¶ the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that¶ programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104¶ Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group¶ construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical¶ crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and¶ which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new ‘outsider’¶ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that¶ various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide,¶ can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105¶ This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is¶ genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group¶ identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation¶ processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social¶ crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities,¶ and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed ‘outsider’ group vindicating¶ various forms of violence.¶ Conclusions¶ While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism¶ toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the¶ deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security¶ issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy¶ and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with¶ their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts¶ of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining¶ state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements.¶ Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries¶ that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect¶ largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change¶ impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic¶ transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of¶ state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.¶ The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations¶ by Western security agencies – as a discourse – is therefore not only interwoven with¶ growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological¶ failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which¶ themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This¶ expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the¶ social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated¶ at any cost – precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is¶ ideologically beyond question.¶ As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation¶ and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between¶ natural resources and conflict per se. Neither ‘resource shortages’ nor ‘resource abundance’ (in¶ ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.¶ There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict.¶ The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge¶ or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors¶ choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires¶ close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption¶ and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic¶ causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the¶ forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those¶ groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.¶ Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy¶ ‘reform’ is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a¶ civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is¶ breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial¶ civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked¶ crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation¶ in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition¶ to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic¶ transformation.¶ Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of¶ research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in¶ terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity¶ for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required,¶ they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse ‘Others’, newly constructed as traditional¶ security threats enormously amplified by global crises – a process that guarantees the intensification¶ and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe.¶ Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR¶ and the wider social sciences – drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies,¶ political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with¶ developments in the natural sciences – is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks¶ which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

### Solvency

#### Status quo Mexican investment either solves or proves the impact is inevitable

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(“Transcending the Rio Grande,” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/pdf/mexico.pdf)//BB

Mexico’s energy consumption is growing more rapidly than more developed countries, ¶ and conventional energy sources are unable to meet a considerable portion of this growing demand.48 As a result, renewable energy sources are uniquely suited to meet Mexico’s ¶ growing energy demand as well as fulfill Mexico’s renewed commitment to diversifying its ¶ energy matrix to include more sustainable sources of energy. Along with the highly noted ¶ energy reform legislation passed by the Mexican Congress in October of 2008, two laws ¶ were passed that focus exclusively on developing Mexican alternative energy and on the ¶ creation of a national program to expand Mexico’s renewable energy matrix.49 In addition, ¶ a Fund for the Energy Transition and Sustainable Use of Energy was established with ¶ resources of 3 billion pesos annually to support projects for energy efficiency, renewable ¶ energy, and diversification of sustainable energy sources.

#### Latin America will never adopt renewables – fossil fuels are too economically viable and oil lobby.

Meisen and Krumpel, 9– President of the Global Energy Network Institute / Research-Associate at GENI (Peter and Sebastian, “Renewable Energy Potential of Latin America”, December 2009; < http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-potential-of-latin-america/Potential%20of%20Renewables%20in%20Latin%20America-edited-12-16%20\_Letter\_.pdf>)//Beddow

In reality the situation of renewable energies in Latin America is not as positive or optimistic as we might want to think, or as certain statistical data lead us to believe. There are many problems associated with the implementation of renewables as well as their impact on the environment and society. In this context, the main problem for renewable energies in Latin America is in the way energy and development policies have been constructed. In most cases, energy policies and strategies in Latin America have excluded renewables and other alternatives as being too costly and technologically unfeasible, or by arguing that the country does not have the capabilities to implement them. The easiest explanation for this, and one which is usually mentioned, is the lack of incentive and foresight. Since the region has an abundance of resources such as oil, gas, and hydro, it is in general easier, cheaper and more technically feasible to keep exploiting conventional energy resources than to in vest in renewable energies or create appropriate renewable energy policies. Another common explanation is that the development of renewable energies clash wi th the interest of powerful players, particularly large energy companies, and, therefore, there are few incentives to promote them.

#### Renewables can’t solve warming—they’re not a replacement

Angus 12– ecosocialist advocate, citing an extensive study by Richard York, professor at the University of Oregon with an MS in Environmental Studies from Bemidji State University (Iran, “Green energy won’t save the earth without social change”, 3/21/12; < http://climateandcapitalism.com/2012/03/21/green-energy-alone-wont-save-the-earth/>)//Beddow

The most popular techno-fix for global warming is green energy. If energy companies would only deploy wind, hydro, solar, geothermal or nuclear, then emission-intensive fossil fuels will eventually disappear. But will that actually work? A new study by Richard York of the University of Oregon shows that it isn’t that simple. Rather than displacing fossil fuels, green energy sources have proven to be mostly additive. “Do alternative energy sources displace fossil fuels?” published this month in Nature Climate Change, discusses what happened when alternative energy sources were introduced in countries around the world, over the past fifty years. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that new green energy replaces fossil-fuel use, York found that on average each unit of energy use from non-fossil-fuel sources displaced less than a quarter of a unit of energy use from fossil-fuel sources. The picture is worse with electricity, where each new unit generated from green sources displaced less than one-tenth of a unit of fossil-fuel-generated electricity. York writes: “Based on all of the results presented above, the answer to the question presented in the title of this paper – do alternative energy sources displace fossil fuels? – is yes, but only very modestly. The common assumption that the expansion of production of alternative energy will suppress fossil-fuel energy production in equal proportion is clearly wrong.” Why don’t the new sources replace the old? York identifies two key reasons: the inertia of a huge existing fossil-fuel infrastructure, and the power and influence of the coal and oil corporations. “The failure of non-fossil energy sources to displace fossil ones is probably in part attributable to the established energy system where there is a lock-in to using fossil fuels as the base energy source because of their long-standing prevalence and existing infrastructure and to the political and economic power of the fossil-fuel industry.” In other words, eliminating fossil-fuel as an energy source is at least as much a social and political problem as a technical one. “Of course all societies need energy. So, obviously, if societies are to stop using fossil fuels they must have other energy sources. However, the results from the analyses presented here indicate that the shift away from fossil fuel does not happen inevitably with the expansion of non-fossil-fuel sources, or at least in the political and economic contexts that have been dominant over the past fifty years around the world…. “The most effective strategy for curbing carbon emissions is likely to be one that aims to not only develop non-fossil energy sources, but also to find ways to alter political and economic contexts so that fossil-fuel energy is more easily displaced and to curtail the growth in energy consumption as much as possible. “A general implication of these findings is that polices aimed at addressing global climate change should not focus principally on developing technological fixes, but should also take into account human behaviour in the context of political, economic and social systems.” The evidence shows that simply introducing green energy isn’t enough: the introduction must be accompanied by “explicit policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions.” The article is published in a scientific journal, where political and social conclusions can only be expressed in muted form. But Richard York’s research and conclusions reinforce the argument that he and his co-authors (John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark) made more explicitly in their recent book, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Planet. “We are confronting the question of a terminal crisis, threatening most life on the planet, civilization, and the very existence of future generations. … attempts to solve this through technological fixes, market magic, and the idea of a ‘sustainable capitalism’ are mere forms of ecological denial, since they ignore the inherent destructiveness of the current system of unsustainable development – capitalism.”

#### China makes the impact inevitable and they don’t model

**Downs, 8**

Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813\_china\_downs.aspx

China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is fractured among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. China’s fragmented energy policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution, such as a Ministry of Energy, with the authority to coordinate the interests of the various stakeholders. For example, the implementation of energy laws is hampered by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: The central government is still managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew. Contrary to rumors that the NEA’s staff would be as large as 200, it ended up with just 112 people. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of the NDRC Energy Bureau, which had only 50 people, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, China’s new energy administration is unlikely to substantially improve energy governance. The organizational changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, we can expect to see a continuation of business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making; the energy companies will remain important drivers of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and the NEA, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably will resort to “second best” administrative measures to try to eradicate those shortages. The modest tinkering to China’s energy policymaking apparatus unveiled during the March 2008 NPC meeting reflects the conflicts of interest that stymie energy decision-making. Despite widespread recognition among Chinese officials and energy experts of the need to get the country’s energy institutions “right” and the growing chorus of voices calling for the establishment of a Ministry of Energy (MOE), there are powerful ministerial and corporate interests that favor the status quo. The opposition to the creation of a MOE, a hot topic of debate in Chinese energy circles in recent years, was led by the NDRC and the state-owned energy companies. The mere specter of a MOE strikes fear in the heart of the NDRC because it would deprive the NDRC of a substantial portion of its portfolio and important tools of macroeconomic control. The NDRC’s aversion is shared by the energy firms who are reluctant to have another political master and afraid that a MOE would limit their direct access to China’s leadership. Such opposition helps explain why the government was unable to forge a consensus in favor of more robust changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus. Implications for the United States First, US policymakers should recognize that China’s fractured energy policymaking apparatus may constrain the Chinese government from doing all that US policymakers would like it to do – and indeed what Chinese leaders themselves might want to do – to enhance international energy security and combat climate change. If China falls short of our expectations it may not reflect a conscious decision by Beijing to shirk its global responsibilities but rather the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will.

**China key to solving emissions**

**Chen et al., 10** Chen, Qian, Peridas, Qiu, Ho: Natural Resources Defense Council, Friedmann: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Li, Wei: Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung, Fowler: Clean Air Task Force, Seligsohn, Liu, Forbes: World Resources Institute, Zhang: China Tsinghua University, Zhao: Institute of Engineering Thermophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Jason Chen, Jingjing Qian, George Peridas, Yueming Qiu, Bruce Ho, Julio Friedmann, Xiaochun Li, Ning Wei, S. Ming Sung, Mike Fowler, Deborah Seligsohn, Yue Liu, Sarah Forbes, Dongjie Zhang, Lifeng Zhao, December 2010, “Identifying Near-Term Opportunities For Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in China,” <http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10121001a.pdf)//DR>. H

Coal—the most carbon-laden of the three major fossil fuels (i.e., natural gas, crude oil, and coal)—supplies nearly **70 percent** of China’s energy. China’s heavy reliance on this fuel is reflected by the fact that during the last five years the country has accounted for nearly fourfifths of the global growth in coal consumption.8 In 2008, China consumed more coal than North and South America, the European Union, Russia, the Middle East, and Africa combined (see Figure 2.1). Heavy reliance on coal has sharply driven up China’s CO2 emissions. In 1994, China emitted 3.07 billion tons, or gigatons (Gt), of CO2. A decade later, in 2004, China’s CO2 emissions stood 60 percent higher, at over 5 Gt a year.9 As a result, China’s annual CO2 emissions now exceed those of the United States.10 With its CO2 emissions surging nearly eight times faster than in the rest of the world (see Figure 2.2), China has a pivotal role to play in the global effort to prevent the worst impacts of global warming from occurring.11

#### Renewable assistance to Mexico pads corporate coffers, while robbing the inhabitants of their land

Pasqualetti 11 (Martin J. Pasqualetti, Senior Sustainability Scientist, Global Institute of Sustainabillity, 5/25/2011, “Social Barriers to Renewable Energy Landscapes”, Wiley Online Library | JJ) GENDER MODIFIED BECAUSE JJ DOESN’T KNOW WHAT PRONOUNS ARE

\*Oaxaca – wa-ha-kah

The ultimate scale of development will rely on several factors other than raw wind strength and consistency. Much will depend on siting choices and cooperation between developers and local residents. Current plans are to concentrate the wind farms near the rural communities of La Venta and La Ventosa, northeast of Juchitán (Stevenson 2009). This could be a portentous choice. Founded in 1486, Juchitán is now home to about 75,000 citizens, mostly Zapotecs and Huaves. It is also the seat of the Coalición Obrera, Campesina, Estudiantil del Istmo, an inﬂuential popular movement that matured in the 1970s combining socialists, peasants, students, and indigenous groups (COCEI 2010). The relative ease of passage through the low-lying region of the isthmus has contributed to its strategic value and the long history of occupation in Juchitán. Such long occupation has helped create a close association between the people and their land (O’Connor and Kroefges 2008), as well as substantial autonomy from the central government in Mexico City. The autonomy is reﬂected in the history of political unrest and activism common in this region. A revolt took place in 1834, and life was again interrupted by the Mexican-American War in 1847. Less than twenty years on, the people of Juchitán defeated the French. Porﬁrio Díaz, later a dictator of Mexico, populated his army mostly with citizens from Juchitán. In 1910 other natives of the town organized in support of the revolutionaries Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. By 1980 Juchitán had attracted further attention by electing a left-wing, prosocialist municipal government, the ﬁrst Mexican community to do so in the twentieth century. In February 2001 Juchitán received the military caravan of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional. Many residents in the region clearly have an anarchist bent. Given this historical and cultural background, it is not surprising that the changes which accompany the introduction of wind power have met with some resistance. In recent years the tendency for citizen activism has evolved into increasingly common clashes, ones that pit locals against the federal government over plans to alter their sense of landscape permanence by installing wind megaprojects in the area. Among the contentions is that local residents are receiving meager compensation for leasing land to the wind developers.2 The reported amount has ranged from amounts equivalent to U.S. $51 per acre per year for a single turbine to U.S. $40–$48 per acre per year (Sanchez 2007; Hawley 2009). Others have reported the rate to be as low as U.S. $15 per year for 7.4 acres, as Karen Trejo reported in 2008: Faustina López Martínez, originally from the village of Juchitán, complained that the companies promised agriculture aid without ever following through. On the lands where she used to plant corn to sell, the Spanish company Union FENOSA plans to install windmills to generate wind energy for the next 30 years, and possibly extending to double the term. In exchange, López will receive 150 pesos (less than US $15) each year for the rent of each of her 3 hectares (7.4 acres) of land. Such disproportion is one of the principal reasons behind the formation of organizations such as the Grupo Solidario de la Venta, which are opposed to wind development in the isthmus (Girón-Carrasco 2007). This and other groups claim that the “government has been violating the rights of indigenous peoples, causing both environmental and cultural destruction; that the intent of . . . wind park construction is to turn the isthmus into an industrial corridor” (Sanchez 2007). These strong antiwind sentiments are being noticed in other wind-rich countries, including the Netherlands: “In Juchitán, in southern Mexico, the wind always blows. Very hard. Wind farms are springing up like mushrooms . . . to the great displeasure of the local Zapotec farmers. . . . Wind power projects on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in southeastern Mexico harm land of Zapotecan farmers” (La Ruta). As in Massachusetts and Scotland, politics are playing an important and continuing role in Oaxaca. Developers, politicians, and officials of various government agencies in Mexico City have been peppered with questions of propriety, fairness, inﬂuence, and control. The public advocacy organization National Wind Watch oﬀers this explanation: “The growing resistance to wind farm construction in southern Oaxaca . . . is based on local landowners’ negative negotiating experiences with the CFE [the national electricity company], discomfort with the broad freedoms seemingly granted to multinational corporations and an increasing concern about the possible environmental consequences of the wind farms themselves” (Sanchez 2007,). “Are the ejidatarios being victimized?” asked a reporter from USA Today, at a public presentation at the Benjamin Franklin Library in Mexico City in June 2009 (Hawley 2009).3 A local leftist farm group known as the Asamblea en Defensa de la Tierra y el Territorio has complained about the treatment it has been receiving, saying: “They promise progress and jobs, and talk about millions in investment in clean energy from the winds that blow through our region, but the investments will only beneﬁt business~~men~~ [people], all the technology will be imported . . . and the power won’t be for local inhabitants” (Stevenson 2009). The group is calling on supporters to defend the land “inherited from our ancestors.” They have said “no to the wind energy megaproject in the isthmus that desecrates our lands and cultural heritage” (Sanchez 2007). Protestors have taken to the streets, and incidents of rock throwing, accompanied by minor injuries, have occurred. In addition, some groups have barricaded roads leading to wind sites; others have marched, holding antiwind banners (Figure 12). Most of the protests are over the loss of land: “The Greedy Grabbers need land, and lots of it, to be able to put up sticks and blades and thus seize and put a meter between the people and heaven itself” (Giordano 2006).

The affirmative’s developmental approach to resolving politics has been tried and failed – it only serves to inflict structural violence on populations while filling the pockets of elites

Nhanenge, 11 (Jytte Nhanenge, ecological and social activist, MA in development and MA in philosophy from the University of South Africa, extremely prominent theorist in development studies, 2011, “Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,” pp 19-22) gz

The official intention with establishing the development program in the South was to increase economic growth assumed necessary to alleviate poverty. However, there is no evidence that absolute poverty is decreasing; rather the reverse is the case. In addition, economic growth is declining. For economic growth and for almost all other development indicators, the 20 years as from 1980 to 2000 of the current form of economic globalization, have shown a clear decline in progress as compared with the previous two decades. In sub-Saharan Africa, per capita income fell by almost 25 percent during the 1980s. Investment has decreased with 50 percent, and export has decreased by 45 percent since 1980. The world’s low-income countries (2.4 billion people), account for just 2.4 percent of world export. External debt has risen from 10 billion USD in 1972 to 130 billion USD in 1987. Presently the Third World debt is around 500 billion USD. According to Shah, for every one USD the South receives in aid, it spends over twenty-five USD on debt repayment. In the poorest countries, it is commonly the people that did not enjoy the money, who are likely to pay the debt. Many development commentators find that lack of development is not causing these figures, rather development itself has brought about such impoverishment: when development turns natural resources, which provide a large number of people with decent subsistence livelihood, into industrial raw materials that benefit relatively few, then development creates poverty. (Ekins 1992; Naidoo 2009; Shah 2009b.) When development projects use the lands, soils, and waters of traditional people to produce commercial crop and industrial food for the market, then traditional people cannot anymore live from their natural resources. Moreover, major development projects often include removal of people from their traditional society into another social constellation with different norms where they cannot participate. The outcome of traditional people’s exposure to development is that they lose all, which gave meaning to them in their lives. Before development disposed them, they were not poor. They lived modest but self-sustaining lives from their environment. Their communities also considered them useful and productive members. However, when development diverted natural resources towards economic growth, people became poor and their natural resources became exhausted. From this, it follows that development destroys wholesome and sustainable lifestyles, creates scarcity of basic needs, excludes an increasing number of people from their entitlement to food, and generates real poverty or misery. Seen in this way, development is a threat for the survival of the great majority. Rather that being a strategy for poverty alleviation, development is consequently creating poverty and environmental destruction. (Ekins 1992; Shiva 1989, 1990.) One example is the World Bank sponsored Narmada Valley Project in India’s states of Gujarat Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The proposed two large dams will displace 200,000 mainly tribal people, with no prospect of giving them fertile land elsewhere. The organization Survival International suggests that the Indian government has not identified land for resettlement because there is no land available. Other people occupy almost all of the cultivatable land in the region; the remaining land is too poor for permanent farming. These people will therefore become development refugees living in the slumps of Bombay, like so many before them. Beneficiaries from the dam will be the better off landowners, who will receive water for irrigation. The hydro-electricity produced by the dam will benefit the industries and the urban middle class. Experience shows that the wealth, the increased productivity will create, does not trickledown to the poor. Rather the difference between rich and poor will increase and poverty will intensify. Provision of drinking water meant to benefit the poorest people in the most arid lands was a major justification for the dams. It is highly unlikely that the dam will ever deliver this necessity. (Ekins 1992; Elliot 1994) In 1990, some 70 ongoing projects of the World Bank were forcibly displacing 1.5 million people. In almost all the cases, the dispossessed will end up impoverished. This is because the so-called “resettlement and rehabilitation” process is highly inadequate. In Indonesia, the Kedung Ombo dam displaced 20,000 without compensation. The 12,500 dispossessed of the Ruzizi II dam on the Zaire/Rwanda border received inadequate compensation. Another example is Kenya’s Kiambere hydroelectric project. BBC News showed the project in April 2005. For the television presenter the project was an example of how development alleviates poverty by giving local people energy as a way out of their poverty. Nevertheless, according to Ekins the project displaced 6,000 local people without compensation. (Ekins, Hillman, and Hutchison 1992.) In order to justify the centralization of traditional people’s natural resources the governments argue that industrialization will not only use the natural resources but also provide jobs and thus income for people’s survival. However, this is only a theoretical model. Often industrialists cannot use the labor of the indigenous people, who in a modern perception are unskilled, and who frequently are also illiterate. Hence, what industries want is to use the fields, forests, fishes, and rivers on which the people subsist. Thus, in the name of progress and development, the governments appropriate these resources, hand them over to owners of industries, who turn them into market goods, which the dispossessed can never hope to buy. (Ekins, Hillman, and Hutchison 1992.) One should add that even if these people would get work, employment does not necessarily generate an escape from poverty. Average wages in the US fell with 9 percent from 1980 to 1989. In 1987, 31.5 percent of the working force was receiving poverty level pay.

According to the Census Bureau, median household income in the United States fell to 50,303 USD in 2008, a drop of 3.6 percent. This is the biggest annual drop seen since the government started keeping records in 1947. In Africa, it is also common that farmers and industries employ people as daily labors. In this way, they can pay salaries that are below the official minimum level. The exploitation of poor people, by rich people is a widespread practice in African countries. Hence, the profit from industries is not benefitting workers; the owners direct the profit to themselves and their shareholders. (Dave Manual.com 2009; Ekins, Hillman, and Hutchison 1992.) The reason why development cannot alleviate poverty relates to the false trust in the “growth and trickle-down approach.” The conventional belief is that economic growth will generate wealth in society, which eventually will trickle-down to the poor segment, and thus alleviate poverty. The blind faith in this strategy comes from its ability to make significant improvements in average life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, and Gross National Product. Based on this experience development aid from the North is directed to increase economic growth in the South. However, what experts overlook, is the model’s inherent side effect of inequality. The distribution of the benefits is extremely uneven. The result is that people with the most desperate needs experience virtually no improvement in their living conditions. (Trainer 1997.) The growth strategy has the aim to maximize the rate of growth of business turnover i.e. to increase investment, sales, exports, and GNP, as fast as possible. The economic experts assume that the increased wealth this produces, the capitalists will re-invest in society; this will then further increase productivity, and will trickle-down and enrich even the poorest. In reality, very little wealth ever trickles down. The strategy does result in a rapid increase of national wealth, but those who are already rich get almost all of it. The reason that the wealth generated will flow into production of goods, which are attractive for the high-income earners and for export to the rich countries. Thus, the wrong industries will be set up in the South. Rather than producing simple tools, cheap housing, and clean water, all of which are helpful for poor people, capitalists invest their resources into export plantations or car factories. In addition, the rich people in the South often want to spend their money on Western lifestyles. They therefore import Western consumer goods, rather investing their wealth into social production. This will not give livelihoods to poor people. Their choice oppositely gives income to the North. Thus, paradoxically, development aid ends up benefitting the Southern elite and the rich countries in the North, which provided the initial aid, rather than the poor people in the country who received the aid. Consequently, the growth and trickle-down strategy is on a head-on collision course with anything that one can call an appropriate development strategy (Ekins 1992; Trainer 1997.) In this way, development creates a cycle that is exploitative of poor people in poor countries: First rich countries give aid to poor countries. Secondly, the aid benefits activities relating mainly to the middle-class and the elites. Thirdly, these people spend their profit on production of export goods or on imports from the rich countries. Fourthly, in the process the elite use the natural resources of subsistence living people. Fifthly, the traditional people loose their subsistence, and their governments do not compensate them; these people therefore become destitute and absolute poor. Paul Ekins (1992) calls it the “aid and development cycle.” Ted Trainer (1997)calls it “inappropriate development.”

### Case

#### No extinction from disease

Malcolm **Gladwell**, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 19**95**, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

#### The affirmative’s discourse of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”

Gomel 2000(Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

#### Food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance

Alcock 9 (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)

Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.

### No War

#### The affirmative’s claim of “no war” posits *war as event*, making militarization of the planet inevitable

Cuomo, 96 – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests

; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

## 2NC

**2nc fw**

**Representations come first in the context of climate change**

**Foust et al. 8** (Christina R. Foust, Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, et al., with William O. Murphy, Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, and Chelsea Stow, Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, 2008, “Global Warming and Apocalyptic Rhetoric: A Critical Frame Analysis of US Popular and Elite Press Coverage from 1997-2007,” Paper Submitted to the Environmental Communication Division of the National Communication Association Convention in San Diego, 11/20, p. 22-23)

Along with critiquing the misinformation created through poorly educated reporters, “balance-as-bias,” and media-corporate ties; and parsing out the complexities which render climate change so difficult to sustain on the public agenda; communication scholars have employed frame analysis to identify the peculiar constructions of climate change in the press. Following Entman (1993), Jones (2006) defines frames as “clusters of messages” which draw “attention on some aspects of reality while ignoring others” (pp. 14-15). As such, frames can create “subtle alterations” in the way that readers judge an event or issue (Iyengar, 1991, p. 11). Frames structure an event’s or issue’s meaning through partial and selective views, with consequences that stretch beyond readers’ interpretations. For example, the persistent tragic framing of the Matthew Shepard murder case relieved the public from a sense of responsibility, which in turn stalled the passage of hate crime prevention legislation (Ott & Aioki, 2002). Frame analysis proves important for the present analysis of global warming discourse, permitting us not only to consider the appearance of an underlying structure, but also to interrogate its possible impacts in terms of public agency, public opinion, policy, and democratic discourse. Though the general framing of climate change in American, European, and global news outlets has been explored, the apocalyptic frame remains underrepresented in the conversation. As noted in the introduction, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996) associate global warming with apocalyptic narratives, but do not fully consider the consequences of this frame on environmental issues. Likewise, Leiserowitz mentions a link between climate change and apocalypse without fully developing how this link is created, or what the full extent of its consequences might be. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes his analysis of the public’s affective images of climate change by cautioning us against taking an “alarmist” stance, as apocalyptic responses (such as “predicting ‘the end of the world’ or ‘the death of the planet’”) could “lead some to a sense of resigned fatalism” (p. 60). Because of its potential to stifle agency, as we elaborate below, a full exploration of apocalyptic frame in elite and popular press accounts of global warming is warranted.

### 2nc alt

**This shift away from traditional militaristic discourse makes room for an individual and ethical approach to environmental politics**

**Deudney, 90** (Daniel Deudney, assistant professor of political science at John Hopkins’; “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 1990, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-372-2011-S3\_IEP/Syllabus/EReadings/07.2/07.2.Deudney1990The-Case.pdf, pg. 469)

Fortunately, environmental awareness **need not depend upon co-opted national security thinking**. Integrally woven into ecological concerns are a powerful set of interests and values—most notably human health and property values, religions and ethics, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. Efforts to raise awareness of environmental problems can thus connect directly with these strong, basic, and diverse human interests and values as **sources of motivation and mobilization**. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldvie Earth Nationalism Transposing existing national security thinking and approaches to environmental politics is likely to be both **ineffective**, and to the extent effective, **counterproductive**. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. Fully grasping the ramifications of the emerging environmental problems requires a **radical rethinking** and reconstitution of many of the major institutions of industrial modernity, including the nation. The nation and the national, as scholars on the topic emphasize, are complex phenomena because so many different components of identity have become conflated with or incorporated into national identities. Most important in Western constructions of national identity have been ethnicity, religion, language, and war memories. However, one dimension of the national—identification with place—has been underappreciated, and this dimension opens important avenues for reconstructing identity in ecologically appropriate ways. Identification with a particular physical place, what geographers of place awareness refer to as "geopiety" and "topophilia," has been an important component of national identity.35 As Edmund Burke, the great philosopher of nationalism, observed, the sentimental attachment to place is among the most elemental widespread and powerful of forces, both in humans and in animals. In the modern era the nation-state has sought to shape and exploit this sentimental attachment. With the growth of ecological problems, this sense of place and threat to place takes on a new character. In positing the "bioregion" as the appropriate unit for political identity, environmentalists are recovering and redefining topophilia and geopiety in ways that subvert the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by ecological parameters, or the entire planet as the only naturally autonomous bioregion, environmentalists are asserting what can appropriately be called "earth nationalism." 36 This construction of the nation has radical implications for existing state and international political communities. This emergent earth nationalism is radical both in the sense of returning to fundamental roots, and in posing a fundamental challenge to the state-sponsored and defined concept of nation now hegemonic in world politics. It also entails a **powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection** as the practice of national security.

**2nc motivation fails**

The link turn is empirically denied - alarmism is high now and responses to warming are low

Foust and Murphy 2009 (Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 )

Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with steadily increasing amounts of communication regarding climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser & Dilling, 2004).

No long run solvency from fear appeals - best studies prove

O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009 (Saffron O’Neill is a tutor at the University of East Anglia, and a research fellow with the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. Sophie Nicholson-Cole is a senior research associate in the Tyndall Centre for Climate

Change Research at the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom. “Fear Won’t Do It” Promoting Positive Engagement With Climate Change Through Visual and Iconic Representations)

The laboratory studies reviewed by Hastings et al. (2004) often tell nothing of the long-term effectiveness of fear campaigns or about exposure to repeated fearful messages. There is also little literature examining longitudinal attitudes toward climate change and decarbonization-oriented behavior change. For example, Lowe et al. (2006) report that fear-inducing appeals are unlikely to have long-lasting impacts. Lowe et al. carried out a pre/post-test survey before and after watching the climate change disaster movie The Day After Tomorrow (Emmerich, 2004), with survey themes followed up a month later with focus groups. They found that although the majority of participants (67%) in the post-test agreed that “everybody has to do something” about climate change, this sense of urgency had substantially diminished by the time the focus groups took place.

### AT: Perm

#### **B. Use of security reps is a strategic political choice – they already shifted the focus of the debate away from the reality of environmental impacts when they chose to represent them in apocalyptic terms**

Trennel 6 (Paul Trennel, Ph. D from the University of Wales, Department of International Politics; “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security,” September 2006, http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/410/trenellpaulipm0060.pdf?sequence=2)

With the understanding of security as a performative rather than descriptive act in place the debate over environmental security takes on a new character. As Ole Waever has detailed, under the speech act conception of security, the “use of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is a decision for conceptualization a special way. When an issue is “securitized” the act itself tends to lead to certain ways of addressing it” (Waever, 1995: 65). Therefore, the focus shifts from the question of whether the environment is in reality a threat to human well being – the question which underpinned the early work on the topic by those such as Mathews and Ullman – and onto the issue of whether the conditions invoked by applying the security tag are desirable for addressing the issue at hand. As Huysmans has said “One has to decide…if one wants to approach a problem in security terms or not…the is-question automatically turns into a should-question” (1998: 234, 249). The response to the should-question of environmental security is dependent on whether or not the way in which security organizes social relations can be seen as beneficial to the attempt to develop effective environmental policy.

### **3. 2nc econ bad**

**Their Selee evidence puts the onus on the North American market to alleviate the environmental issue – this framing the environment in terms of the economy makes collapse inevitable – we control terminal uniqueness**

**Weiskel 97** (Timothy - Research Director @ the Cambridge Climate Research Associates – PhD in Anthropology from Oxford, “Selling Pigeons in the Temple:

The Danger of Market Metaphors in an Ecosystem”, Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values, <http://www.ecoethics.net/OPS-008.HTM>) //MD

The natural order of the world and our role within it is affirmed by market enthusiasts and politicians alike to be an inevitable manifestation of the ongoing logic of an economy of unending, capitalist accumulation. In recent electoral history, politicians took pride in mouthing the simple syllogism, "it's the economy, stupid!" -- as if the only significant role of political leadership was to "grow the economy." Whether we like it or not -- whether we fully know it or not -- this entire worldview is subconsciously enlisted whenever we surrender to the use of market metaphors in devising public policy. It is no wonder that in this framework it is impossible to formulate effective environmental policy to protect biodiversity. Such a worldview arbitrarily restricts the notion of what is possible to what is profitable. Market metaphors truncate the range of policy options open to environmental leaders, and the vocabulary and images these metaphors generate completely fail to capture what we humans value most about our rich and complex world of everyday human experience. The insidious thought control exercised by market metaphors in the public discourse needs to be squarely confronted and firmly rejected. Only by stepping outside the make-believe world of these market metaphors is it possible to see why they mystify rather than clarify our environmental circumstance. Essentially, market metaphors are based on a logical fallacy that projects a fundamental falsification of reality. Despite frequent appeals to the "real world," market advocates live in a self-contained world of abstract modeling, statistical fantasies and paper currency that serves as a proxy measure of wealth. In fact, the real world is quite a different place, consisting of the physical parameters of all life forms that can be measured in terms of meters from sea-level, metric tons of gas emissions and degrees of temperature variation. The human economy needs to be understood as a subset of this physical ecosystem and not the other way around. Environmental policy based on an inverted representation of reality cannot help but fail in the long run. It is for this reason that economism -- the belief that principles of market economics can and should always be used to resolve environmental public policy dilemmas -- represents such a palpable failure of political leadership. Further, the attempt to substitute economism for meaningful public policy constitutes a blatant abdication of the public trust. This tragic abdication of the public trust through the relentless pursuit of economism has fueled the current righteous indignation of global citizens sensitive to the environment and concerned about the prospect of human survival. Politicians under the spell of economism fail to grasp what growing numbers of decent citizens sense and seek to affirm from a very deep level of conviction, and that is simply this: biodiversity must be saved for its intrinsic, expressive, and relational value -- not simply for the momentary advantage it may yield in some economist's cost-benefit calculations. If global policy makers do not free themselves from the trap of market mantras, their claim to leadership will be seen to be vacuous and illegitimate in the long run. This will be so because misplaced market metaphors cannot help but prove fatal in mediating human relationships with the environment. Taken together they have the power to drive industrial civilization into the sad syndrome of "overshoot-and-collapse" so often characteristic of failed economies of accumulation throughout human history. Unless radically different forms of valuation can be rediscovered, unless public leaders can learn to embrace and articulate them, and unless these leaders can then proceed to formulate effective public policy based on these new values to change collective human behavior, we will witness the demise of industrial society as the unavoidable outcome of "business as usual." In short, public leadership needs now to define, declare and defend the public good in terms that transcend private self-interest. There are no doubt connections between the public good and private gain, but to justify the former exclusively in terms of the latter is a fundamental mistake of moral reasoning. Without political leadership that can understand this fundamental difference and learn to defend the public good in its own right, industrial civilization will become irretrievably consumed in a scramble for private profit and personal advantage in a dismal world of diminishing resources. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, expressed this fear with a rivetting sense of urgency in his opening remarks at the Earth Summit Plus Five conference in New York.(6) Failure to act now could damage our planet irreversibly, unleashing a spiral of increased hunger, deprivation, disease and squalor. Ultimately, we could face the destabilising effects of conflict over vital natural resources....We must not fail. In past epochs individual religious and spiritual figures emerged to warn society of this kind of impending doom. Prophets of old inveighed against gluttonous consumption based on inequity and iniquity, and they warned societies of the physical consequences of failing to mend their ways. Perhaps more importantly, they served to remind societies of the natural order of the created world and the proper place for humankind within it. Amos, Jesus of Nazareth and Mohammed of Medina all arose in the ancient near east with strikingly parallel messages in this regard. Jews, Christians and Muslims to this day retain scriptural traditions which remind them that the earth does not ultimately belong to humans, nor will their mistreatment of the earth or their fellow creatures go unpunished. In these religious traditions arrogant, self-centered behavior with regard to the created order is thought to be morally wrong, however expedient or profitable it may prove to be for individuals in the short run. We are not fully informed by the preserved text, but one suspects that selling pigeons in the temple prompted a sense of moral indignation on the part of Jesus of Nazareth, not because the prices were a bit too high. Rather such activity inspired moral outrage because selling pigeons in the temple involved a fundamental confusion of the market place with sacred space. It is -- perhaps not surprisingly -- the scientists who speak with the prophetic voice of conviction in our day. Physicists like Nobel Laureate Henry Kendall, the late astronomer Carl Sagan, the evolutionary biologist Edward Wilson and renowned "public" scientists like the late oceanographer Jacques Cousteau now provide us with the clarion call to awareness and action that parallels the prophetic message of old. In a document entitled World Scientists' Warning to Humanity the Union of Concerned Scientists representing more than one hundred Nobel laureates put the message quite plainly:(7) Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring about. It is hard to image a more thorough embodiment of the ancient prophetic tradition. Nevertheless, economists and politicians -- the scribes and Pharisees of our day -- do not yet seem to have understood the point. It is not that their prices are inaccurate -- goodness knows we have some of the world's most clever economists and accountants devoted to the task of assigning nature its cash value. We cannot expect much better on this score. But the issue before us is more fundamental than this. The essential problem is that to approach the issue of biodiversity as if it were an exercise in global bean-counting is fundamentally wrongheaded. It is wrong because it mistakes price for value, proffering market valuations as a proxy surrogate for a meaningful discussion of values. In such a constricted framework there can never be a purposeful debate -- only a mindless, mechanical and endless set of calculations. Given the two-year time frame of the electoral cycle and the pressures to craft policy to please rich and influential interest groups, there are powerful and evident reasons why politicians may well wish to avoid meaningful discussions about values and the environment. In this sense, the alliance between economists and politicians is a marriage of considerable convenience for both partners, but it must be made clear to each of them that this is not acceptable as a mode of public leadership. On this point, scientists and spiritual leaders agree, and it is for this reason that they have joined forces in such impressive numbers to express themselves in terms of the moral obligations facing the human community. The Union of Concerned Scientists has joined with the National Religious Partnership for the Environment to reiterate the prophetic message in churches, temples and mosques across the country and around the world. In a similar vein, research scientists at Harvard have provided strong support for the activities of the Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values convened by the University's Committee on Environment and the Center for the Study of Values in Public Life in order specifically to explore the full range of valuation -- not just economic costs -- which can be drawn upon in developing public policy to protect the environment and biodiversity. The message from spiritual leaders and research scientists alike is as clear as it is forceful: we did not create the world; we cannot control it; we must not destroy it. More precisely: we must not commodify and merchandise biodiversity merely because in the short run it may appear profitable for us to do so. Convinced that we know the price of everything we will soon have lost the ability to value anything that is priceless. The capacity to value some things and human experiences beyond all measure of worldly worth and to esteem them without any thought of their exchange value or sale is surely one of the most cherished attributes that makes us human. To forget this or deny it is to disavow our humanity, and **down that road lies our swift and certain extinction.** The capacity to appreciate intrinsic value is not a quality of humanity that it would be wise to denigrate, dismiss or eliminate in formulating environmental public policy. On the contrary, it may well constitute our last, best hope for survival as a species.

## 1NR

### Oil Lobby

#### Latin America will never adopt renewables – fossil fuels are too economically viable and oil lobby.

Meisen and Krumpel, 9– President of the Global Energy Network Institute / Research-Associate at GENI (Peter and Sebastian, “Renewable Energy Potential of Latin America”, December 2009; < http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-potential-of-latin-america/Potential%20of%20Renewables%20in%20Latin%20America-edited-12-16%20\_Letter\_.pdf>)//Beddow

In reality the situation of renewable energies in Latin America is not as positive or optimistic as we might want to think, or as certain statistical data lead us to believe. There are many problems associated with the implementation of renewables as well as their impact on the environment and society. In this context, the main problem for renewable energies in Latin America is in the way energy and development policies have been constructed. In most cases, energy policies and strategies in Latin America have excluded renewables and other alternatives as being too costly and technologically unfeasible, or by arguing that the country does not have the capabilities to implement them. The easiest explanation for this, and one which is usually mentioned, is the lack of incentive and foresight. Since the region has an abundance of resources such as oil, gas, and hydro, it is in general easier, cheaper and more technically feasible to keep exploiting conventional energy resources than to in vest in renewable energies or create appropriate renewable energy policies. Another common explanation is that the development of renewable energies clash wi th the interest of powerful players, particularly large energy companies, and, therefore, there are few incentives to promote them.

### No Tradeoff

#### The plan doesn't address consumption and produces – means they can’t solve and turns case

Byrne et al 9 - Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware (John, “Relocating Energy in the Social Commons: Ideas for a Sustainable Energy Utility,” Sage, April 2009, http://bst.sagepub.com/content/29/2/81.full.pdf+html ) //JG

The threat of global warming has propelled renewable energy from policy Siberia to policy priority. Its impressive rise to prominence has been swift and, also, puzzling. While renewables lack the industrial heft of nuclear power, they nevertheless have left the engineering garage and are now courted in the boardrooms of big industry and big finance. Their recent success has been aptly described as a passage “from love-ins to logos” (Glover, 2006). Power and profit projections once reserved solely for the globally integrated fossil fuel system now extend to include renewable energy markets as well. Industry proponents and market analysts project billions of dollars in growth in the renewable energy market over the next decade. Wave, wind, solar, and hydropower are all considered essential technologies to address energy demand in a carbon-constrained world. Reminiscent of the institutional alliances that led to the creation of the industrial mega-energy systems that have dominated modernity, the call for public and private investment in renewable energy has the political ring and economic ka-ching normally reserved for the overlords of the modern energy scheme. The corporate renewable energy movement has studied the tactics of its competitors and adapted them to their needs. Appropriating the symbols of technology triumphalism of nuclear power (Byrne, Glover, & Alroe, 2006, p. 16-17), corporate renewable energy has launched a campaign for, fittingly, a “Manhattan Project” that can vault Big Wind and other renewables with extra-large size ambitions to a new level (Wilson, 2008). The new order is visualized with imagery suggesting the benign nature of giant wind turbines in pastoral settings. To secure the support of technologically minded moderns, these same turbines are applauded for their complexity and scale—far larger than the Statue of Liberty, built with the exotic chemistry of composites, and aerodynamically designed with highly sophisticated computer models, the technology readily earns hi-tech status (Parfit, 2005). Contesting the imagery is difficult. Big Wind resisters cite noise, bird mortality, and the industrialization of heretofore largely untrammeled land and seascapes in their arguments against Big Wind farms. But supporters counter with scientific evidence offered by experts ranging from ornithologists to acoustics specialists and underscore the larger threat of global warming in defense of these carbon-free alternatives. Importantly, the green energy case pits one set of environmental values against another, and depends on the priority of climate change to win out. But equally important, the environmental case for green energy fails to challenge the affluence-based development path secured by earlier energy systems. Rather than questioning the underlying premise of modern society to produce and consume without constraint, contemporary green energy advocates warmly embrace creating “bigger and more complex machines to spur and sate an endlessly increasing world energy demand” (Byrne & Toly, 2006, p. 3) Marketing slogans originally justifying fossil energy-based obesity can be revamped to suit the new green energy agenda: choosier mothers choose renewables and better living through green energy will motivate the postclimate change consumer to do the right thing. Yet the green energy agenda will not change the cause of the global warming threat (and so many other environmental harms), namely, unlimited consumption and production. In this sense, large renewable energy systems, touted as saviors of the planet, actually appear mainly to save modernity. A final problem specific to an extra-large green energy project is the distinctive environmental alienation it can produce. The march of commodification is spurred by the green titans as they seek to enter historic commons areas such as mountain passes, pasture lands, coastal areas, and the oceans, in order to collect renewable energy. Although it is not possible to formally privatize the wind or solar radiation (for example), the extensive technological lattices created to harvest renewable energy on a grand scale functionally preempt commons management of these resources.10 Previous efforts to harness the kinetic energy of flowing waters should have taught the designers of the mega-green energy program and their environmental allies that environmental and social effects will be massive and will preempt commons-based, society-nature relations. Instead of learning this lesson, the technophilic awe that inspired earlier energy obesity now emboldens efforts to tame the winds, waters, and sunlight—the final frontiers of he society-nature commons—all to serve the revised modern ideal of endless, but low- to no- carbon emitting, economic growth.

#### Renewables don’t offset fossil fuels – boomerang effect ensures it just drives up consumption

Zehner 12 – visiting Scholar at UC Berkeley (Ozzie, “Solar Cells and Wind Turbines Don't Offset Fossil Fuel Use, According to New Book, Green Illusions,” Wall Street Journal, June 12 2012, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/solar-cells-and-wind-turbines-dont-offset-fossil-fuel-use-according-to-new-book-green-illusions-2012-06-12 ) //JG

Renewable energy technologies do not offset fossil fuel use in the United States according to a new environmental book, Green Illusions (June 2012, University of Nebraska Press), by University of California - Berkeley visiting scholar Ozzie Zehner. In fact, building more solar cells and wind turbines could actually accelerate fossil fuel use unless nations take other steps to avoid a rebound effect. Many renewable energy researchers assume that building solar cells and wind farms will displace coal use and lower carbon dioxide levels. However, Zehner explains that subsidizing renewable energy merely expands energy supplies, which exerts a downward pressure on prices. Energy demand subsequently increases. "This brings us right back to where we started: high demand and so-called insufficient supply," says Zehner. "Historically, we've filled that added demand by building more coal-fired power plants, not fewer." "We create an energy boomerang," Zehner remarked during a recent PBS interview. "The harder we throw energy into the grid, the harder demand comes back to hit us on the head. More efficient solar cells, taller wind turbines, and advanced biofuels are all just ways of throwing harder."

### Neolib

#### The plan FORCES energy privatization and dislocation – no positive benefit because the energy just feeds industrial domination

Hawley 9 - former Pulitzer-winning journalist, foreign correspondent

(Chris, “Clean-energy windmills a 'dirty business' for farmers in Mexico,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/environment/2009-06-16-mexico-wind-power\_N.htm)//BB

The windmills stand in rows like an army of Goliaths, steel towers taller than the Statue of Liberty and topped with blades as long as a jetliner's wing. The blades whoosh through the humid air, carving energy from a wind that rushes across Mexico's Isthmus of Tehuantepec on its journey from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. Nearly every day, another tower rises out of the countryside.¶ The isthmus — Mexico's narrowest point — is becoming the Saudi Arabia of alternative energy as U.S. and European companies, emboldened by new technology and high oil prices, rush to stake their claims in one of the world's windiest places. The Mexican government wants the isthmus to produce 2,500 megawatts within three years, a goal that will require thousands of windmills and would catapult Mexico into the top 12 producers of wind energy.¶ "This is one of the finest wind areas in the world, and they are being very ambitious about developing it," said Martin Pasqualetti, an expert on renewable energy at Arizona State University who has studied the region. "They're trying to do in five years what California took 35 years to do."¶ But the energy gold rush has also brought discord, as building crews slice through irrigation canals, divide pastures and cover crops with dust. Some farmers complain they were tricked into renting their land for as little as $46 an acre annually.¶ Opponents of Mexican President Felipe Calderón fear the generators are the first step toward privatizing Mexico's energy sector. And some residents are angry that the electricity being generated is not going to homes here in Oaxaca, one of the poorest states in Mexico, but to power Walmart stores, Cemex cement plants and a few other industrial customers in Mexico.¶ "It has divided neighbors against each other," said Alejo Giron, a communal farmer in La Venta. "If this place has so much possibility, where are the benefits for us?"

#### It’s energy ROBBERY – indigenous protests are solving now, but the aff reverses these gains – provides uniqueness for the turn

Hawley 9 - former Pulitzer-winning journalist, foreign correspondent

(Chris, “Clean-energy windmills a 'dirty business' for farmers in Mexico,” http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/environment/2009-06-16-mexico-wind-power\_N.htm)//BB

At the meeting, representatives from Spanish firm Endesa handed out soft drinks and explained that they wanted to rent land for their wind generators, Sánchez said.¶ It was a complicated deal. The company would pay 1.4% of the profit, plus $300 a year for each tower, with the money divided among the hundreds of landowners, a contract obtained by The Arizona Republic shows. Each landowner would get an additional $4.60 an acre annually, and the company would pay $182 per acre of land damaged during construction. There was a signing bonus of $37.¶ In exchange, property owners would have to get permission from the energy company before selling their land or striking deals for development.¶ One good cow can produce $90 of milk a month, so most farmers were unimpressed, Sánchez said. But the company representatives made it sound like a government program, he said, and there seemed to be little to lose. Many small landowners signed up even though they couldn't read.¶ Meanwhile, construction began on other wind parks. Many landowners were shocked at the disruption. To support the huge generators, crews built gravel roads 50 feet across, hammered in pylons and poured 1,200 tons of concrete for each tower. Pads of gravel 100 feet long and 50 feet wide were dumped onto sorghum fields and grazing land to support the cranes.¶ Farmer Salvador Ordaz now has two roads cutting through his 16 acres of pasture and says part of the land is unusable because of dust and blocked irrigation lines. He has had to cut his herd to 10 cows from 30. "When you think of windmills, you just think of this one tower," Ordaz said. "But it affects a lot more land than that."¶ Some companies are paying 50 cents to $1 per square yard annually for damages and have promised to remove much of the gravel once construction is complete. But Sánchez and about 180 other farmers in the towns of Xadani, Union Hildago and Juchitán decided they wanted none of it. They sued Endesa and two other Spanish companies, Preneal and Union Fenosa, saying the companies had misled poorly educated landowners and tricked them into signing lopsided deals.¶ Endesa and Union Fenosa did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Preneal declined to comment.¶ Pasqualetti said the payments are a fraction of the $3,000 to $5,000 that energy companies pay annually to farmers in Iowa. "The evidence would indicate (Mexican landowners) are not getting what they should be getting," he said.¶ In October, Preneal relented and canceled its contracts with the dissenting landowners. Endesa and Union Fenosa did the same in March.¶ "It's clean energy but dirty business," said Claudia Vera, a lawyer at the Tepeyac Human Rights Center who helped the landowners with their case.¶ Opposition has spread to other towns, sometimes opening up old racial and political feuds.¶ In San Mateo del Mar, populated by Huavé Indians, residents voted to keep out the energy companies, re-igniting territorial disputes with neighboring villages dominated by Zapotec Indians, said local activist Roselia Gutiérrez.¶ In La Venta, proponents and opponents have broken along political party lines, with Institutional Revolutionary Party members supporting the contracts and the more liberal Democratic Revolutionary Party opposing them. On the national level, the Democratic Revolutionary Party has accused Calderón of using the wind farms as a test case for privatizing Mexico's oil and electricity sector.¶ Demonstrations in La Venta have halted construction six times at the Eurus wind farm, owned by Acciona Energy. Graffiti in the town blasts company officials and members of the local ejido, or farm cooperative. "Get out, Wilson!" says one. "La Venta belongs to the ejido members!" says another.¶ The Roman Catholic Diocese of Tehuantepec printed fliers depicting the Spanish companies as invading Spanish galleons. "No to the robbery of our territory! No to the wind power projects!" they say. Hundreds of protesters demonstrated when Calderón came to inaugurate a project in January.

**Failure to incorporate methods of dealing with structural violence into our politics is the failure of politics all together**

**Winter and Leighton in 1999** (Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter: Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and ustice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice) (Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century. Pg 4-5)

Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section ishow and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual/cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition.To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it.

#### Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17